Okta decides who gets in. Atlassian should agree.
Connecting Okta to Atlassian Cloud takes Atlassian Guard Standard, a verified domain, and Okta's Atlassian Cloud app set up for both SAML single sign-on and SCIM provisioning. Atlas Bench, an Atlassian Platinum Solution Partner, sets up the connection, moves access to Okta groups, and tests deprovisioning with a real leaver so a deactivated Okta user loses Atlassian access the same day. The work also covers the accounts single sign-on does not reach: external users, service accounts, and API tokens.
Okta single sign-on and SCIM provisioning for Atlassian Cloud, set up through Atlassian Guard, so joiners get the right access on day one and leavers lose it the same day.
The problem
Most teams turn on single sign-on and assume access is handled. It is not. SSO controls how people sign in. It does not decide who holds an account, which groups grant what, or what happens when someone leaves. Those are provisioning questions, and they live in SCIM.
The gaps show up in the same places. The email attribute differs between the SAML and SCIM settings, so people end up with two Atlassian accounts. Access is assigned to individual users in Okta instead of groups, so those users sync without any app access. An Okta group shares a name with an existing Atlassian group, and the sync waits for someone to decide whether Okta takes over that group's members. Newer SCIM keys expire a year after they are created, and provisioning stops without anyone noticing. Each one leaves accounts nobody can explain at renewal or at audit.
What the work is
Guard and domain setup
Atlassian Guard Standard, domain verification, and the identity provider directory in Atlassian Administration, with a backup admin account outside your verified domains so a bad SAML setting cannot lock everyone out.
SAML single sign-on
The Okta Atlassian Cloud app configured for single sign-on, rolled out through a test authentication policy first, then enforced for every managed account.
SCIM provisioning and group push
Users and groups pushed from Okta, access assigned through groups instead of individuals, and name conflicts with existing Atlassian groups resolved before the first sync.
Deprovisioning you can prove
Unassign or deactivate someone in Okta, and their managed Atlassian account is deactivated. Tested with a real leaver, with the result written down for your auditor.
Moving off the legacy Okta apps
Teams still on Okta's older Jira Cloud and Confluence Cloud apps moved to the Atlassian Cloud app, with attribute differences mapped before cutover.
The accounts SSO does not reach
External users, service accounts, and API tokens inventoried and given owners, with session and token policies for people outside your domains.
How it runs
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Assess
1 weekOkta apps, Atlassian groups, domains, and accounts exported and compared. Conflicts, duplicates, and unowned accounts listed before anything changes.
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Connect
1 to 2 weeksGuard, single sign-on, and SCIM configured, then tested with a pilot group under a test authentication policy.
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Enforce
1 to 2 weeksSingle sign-on enforced for all managed accounts, access moved to Okta groups, and deprovisioning tested end to end. Your team gets the runbook.
What you get
- Okta connected to Atlassian Cloud for SAML single sign-on and SCIM provisioning
- An authentication policy design, including the exceptions and who approved them
- Access mapped to Okta groups, with an owner named for each group
- Deprovisioning tested end to end, with evidence your auditor can read
- An inventory of external users, service accounts, and API tokens, with owners
- A runbook for joiners, movers, leavers, and SCIM key renewal